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Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, it is clear that hopes of a quick reconstruction 
and modernisation of the Ukrainian state as a political and institutional system have not 
been fulfilled. The resistance of the bureaucrats, politicians and oligarchs who make up the 
informal, corrupt systems has proven to be very strong, and the will of part of the political 
elite and the EU and the United States to implement the procedures they have suggested has 
proved insufficient. If not for the war and the economic collapse, which forced Kyiv to seek 
external financial assistance and political support, the modernisation of the state would have 
proceeded even more slowly and with yet greater difficulty. 
The revolution, however, has revealed the profound social changes which have taken place 
over two decades of independence, mainly through generational change and the increasing 
de-Sovietisation of public consciousness. These changes were one of the factors that enabled 
the revolution; and the war in eastern Ukraine has contributed to their intensification, and wi-
dened the circle of people involved in the process of change. These changes are more difficult 
to describe than legislative activity or the work of the law enforcement bodies. It is a matter 
of transforming attitudes rather than ideas, of new perceptions of the Ukrainian citizen’s own 
life and his place in society. In part, this is the result of a new generation, raised in an indepen-
dent state, finding its voice; in part an effect of globalisation, providing new technical tools 
which have had substantial effects on social behaviour, as well as new ideas and doctrines; 
and in part the war, a state of affairs which always accelerates social transformations. Which 
of these changes will prove permanent and which will prove ephemeral is an open question 
today. There is no doubt, however, that the generational transformation will continue.
Two revolutions
The Revolution of Dignity which took place at 
the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 has 
brought about much deeper social changes than 
the Orange Revolution of 2004. The main reason 
for this was its length, and hence the number of 
people involved and the degree to which they 
were involved; as well as the different attitude of 
the protestors and activists towards politicians, 
and also towards the use of violence. The Orange 
Revolution lasted less than three weeks (from 
the beginning of the protests to the decision to 
re-run the second round of the presidential elec-
tions); fewer than a million people participated 
in total, and the action was focused on Kyiv. Its 
aim was to force the recognition of Viktor Yush-
chenko’s electoral victory, and the protest ac-
tions were planned and led by politicians from 
his entourage. The primacy of the political order, 
and therefore the leadership of the politicians, 
was not contested. The protest ended with a po-
litical compromise which allowed the losing side 
to emerge without losing face. 
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The Revolution of Dignity lasted for three 
months; at least 2-3 million people took part 
in it, not only in Kyiv and Lviv but also in many 
other cities. Its purpose was to initially force the 
government to sign the Association Agreement 
with the EU, and later to overthrow the regime 
of Viktor Yanukovych. The protest action was 
initiated by pro-European social groups, and 
the politicians, who were regarded with dis-
trust, proved unable to take control over it. The 
revolution ended with the rejection of the com-
promise negotiated by the politicians, and total 
defeat for the government. 
The Orange Revolution was the work of or-
ganisations which had been preparing for 
several years to fight the regime of President 
Leonid Kuchma; after Yushchenko’s victo-
ry, these forces withdrew from public life 
(apart from the political parties which rep-
resented them). This movement lasted for 
too short a time to be able to beget new, 
meaningful organisations and structures. 
The Revolution of Dignity broke out sponta-
neously, without any advance preparation; 
during its course, however, a number of so-
cial organisations and initiatives arose which 
continued their activities after the end of the 
protests. The Maidan Self-Defence (which in 
2004 was little more than an informal securi-
ty group) became a paramilitary force, able to 
stand up to the militia’s special divisions; it later 
formed the basis for the groups of volunteer 
detachments which played a very important 
part in the first phase of the war in the Donbas.
In 2004, both sides struggled to avoid violence, 
feared bloodshed, and avoided situations that 
could have turned peaceful protests into riots. 
In 2014, both sides were prepared for violence; 
the protesters’ ranks included members of 
paramilitary formations, and the police were 
given free rein to use brutality. The escalation 
of violence led to the massacre of demonstra-
tors on 20 February, although it is worth noting 
that there were also fatalities on the govern-
ment side. In the light of these considerations, 
it is important to state that the majority of the 
Maidan Self-Defence’s members and their op-
ponents (the militants and the thugs support-
ing them, the so-called tytushki) belonged to 
the same generation, which had already been 
brought up in an independent country. 
Wartime volunteers
Before 2013, as in the countries of Central Eu-
rope, volunteer groups in Ukraine had focused 
on various types of charitable activity (help for 
the very poor, the sick, and children) and en-
vironmental matters. According to available 
studies, in 2012 around 10% of the population 
were involved in volunteer work to a greater or 
lesser extent1. This situation changed after the 
outbreak of war. As the state gave up defend-
ing the country (most strikingly in the case of 
Crimea), the burden of the fighting initially rest-
ed on a variety of volunteer formations which 
lacked any logistical support. Aid came from 
a quickly-formed volunteer movement made up 
of hundreds, if not thousands of small groups 
and centres, created in part on the basis of the 
previous support structures from the Maidan; 
there was never any single centre coordinat-
ing their activities. The volunteers supplied the 
fighters with literally every item they needed 
apart from arms and munitions: from food 
and underwear, through drugs and medicines, 
to helmets, bullet-proof vests and night-vision 
equipment. The volunteers also began to deliver 
1 Data from sociological research: Народні помічники: 
портрет українського волонтера, 4 January 2016.
A large volunteer movement has supplied 
the fighters with literally everything they 
needed apart from arms and munitions: 
it has also joined in with taking care of 
refugees from Crimea and the territories 
affected by the war.
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aid to the regular troops (who were also badly 
equipped) as they joined the fight. This activity 
was mainly funded from various kinds of pub-
lic collection. One way this was done involved 
volunteers and draftees from a particular town 
or village being sponsored by the public; the 
local authorities of that place also often par-
ticipated. These activities fostered the recon-
struction of local solidarity, which in many plac-
es had been disturbed in the previous period. 
The involvement of volunteer networks in taking 
care of refugees from Crimea and the territories 
affected by the war was of great importance. 
While the state treated their problems with bu-
reaucratic indifference, the volunteers offered 
not only material assistance, but also mental and 
moral support, a sense of solidarity. In this way 
they contributed to ‘sewing together’ the war-
torn country, something the authorities seem not 
to remember. As of mid-2015, more and more 
groups and volunteer organisations have under-
taken aid programmes for demobilised fighters, 
who often find themselves in difficult living and 
mental conditions; in so doing, the volunteers are 
replacing the state in yet another area. 
The numbers of volunteers are hard to assess. 
In accordance with the studies already cited2, 
during 2015 around 13% of the population of 
Ukraine (around 5.5 million people) undertook 
such activities. The largest percentage of vol-
unteers came from the Ukraine-controlled part 
of the Donbas (19%) and the country’s west-
ern oblasts (14%). Achieving objectives related 
to the war and its consequences represented 
2 Ibid.
65% of the volunteer groups’ activity, a further 
12% involved giving aid to refugees, and 21% 
helping the sick and wounded (although it is 
not clear how this was measured). Up to 41% 
of respondents declared their financial support 
for volunteer activities (up from 21% in 2014). 
According to other studies3, the volunteer 
movement enjoys the greatest public confi-
dence. The level of trust in volunteer groups 
(the difference between expressions of confi-
dence and lack of confidence) stands at 44.1%, 
40.4% for the Church4, 13.5% for other social 
organisations, and 12.4% for the army (all oth-
er entities mentioned had a negative balance 
of trust, including the President [-48.1%], the 
government [-66.3%] and parliament [-72.4%]). 
Some volunteer groups have become import-
ant participants in social life on a national level, 
such as the Emergency Care Reform Package 
(Reanimatsiynyy Paket Reform, or RPR), which 
has drawn up and promoted a number of leg-
islative projects (thus aiding the parliament 
and government in these tasks); and the Psy-
chological Crisis Service, which now numbers 
around 500 specialists providing free psycho-
logical assistance to the families of soldiers and 
refugees, and which also trains social workers 
who may in future form the core of family me-
diation facilities5. However, individual initiatives 
predominate; one example of these is the activ-
ity of Armen Shakharianets, a retiree living near 
Kyiv, who organised a collection of food for the 
troops, and so far has organised convoys to de-
liver more than 500 tons of it6.
3 Information from the Kyiv International Sociology Insti-
tute, based on research from December 2015.
4 It is hard to consider the answers to this question as reliable, 
since Ukraine does not have a single dominant religion, and 
respondents were able to declare their confidence in various 
religious structures (just as they could in various political-
ly-oriented structures).
5 For more on these and other initiatives, see Roman Kravets 
et al., Виросли на Майдані. Волонтерські ініціативи два 
роки потому [Raised on the Maidan. Volunteer initiatives 
two years later], Українська Правда, 6 February 2016; 
http://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2016/02/6/207741/
6 Elena Maksymenko, Харон на Харківській трасі [Charon 
on the road to Kharkiv]; Українська Правда, http://life.
pravda.com.ua/volunteers/2016/01/7/206013/
The ‘wartime’ volunteer movement has 
launched a potential for social innovation, 
and those who participate in it have 
gained the experience of taking individual 
responsibility for the unexpected chal-
lenges they face.
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In addition to the direct, measurable social ef-
fect, the volunteer work is important for an-
other reason. Engaging in such activities is, 
on one hand, an expression of awareness that 
the state has not fulfilled its function, and on 
the other, of the will to replace the state. It is 
thus a result of the ‘de-statifying’ of public con-
sciousness which has been ongoing since 1992: 
a weakening of the view that a person is and 
should be dependent on the state, which in 
turn is obliged to arrange a worthy life for him; 
at the same time, this ‘de-statifying’ favours 
the extinction of such a Soviet-era attitude. 
The ‘wartime’ volunteer movement has launched 
a potential for social ingenuity (innovation), and 
those who participate in it have, among other 
things, gained the experience of taking individ-
ual responsibility for the unexpected challenges 
they are confronted with. 
From the political point of view, it is important 
that the volunteers’ activities, both armed (sol-
diers) and civilian, have shown that the people 
can force the state and the authorities to do 
something without overthrowing it7. Hence the 
growing pressure on the regional and central 
authorities, which often have non-legal forms 
and objectives (such as when a re-run of the 
mayoral elections in Kryviy Rih was forced). 
What did the municipal elections show?
The local government elections in October 2015 
were dominated by the main political parties, 
which were generally already represented in 
7 It is often maintained that had it not been for the armed 
struggle by the voluntary formations, the government 
in Kyiv would not have undertaken any active defence of 
the eastern oblasts.
the regions and cities. Ukraine’s electoral law 
does not allow NGOs or civic initiatives to stand 
in elections. However, in some places, there 
were surprising successes for new forces orig-
inating outside the existing establishment, or 
(like the Samopomich party) which are not fully 
controlled by them. Here we examine the most 
prominent of these successes. 
The biggest surprise was the success of the Peo-
ple Power party, which was founded in 2014 
and has 2600 members, and won a total of 
211 councillors and 4 mayoralties in 32 towns 
around the country (generally smaller ones)8. 
This initiative, begun by a group of political sci-
entists from Kyiv, and led by Oleksandr Solon-
tay, a local government official from the Tran-
scarpathian region, has built up its structures 
by co-opting local initiatives and social groups, 
and is aiming to represent the middle classes 
(i.e. young educated professionals). This party, 
based on the local ‘Together’ Initiative Group 
(which when the campaign began numbered 
only ten people) won 8.5% (about 10,000) votes 
in Mariupol, which gave it 5 seats out of 54 on 
the city council. Moreover, the party pushed all 
the parties of the current ruling camp off the 
council (the Opposition Bloc won, as expected; 
the third force in the council is now Our Coun-
try, a party made up of former members of the 
Party of Regions, which now supports Poros-
henko). In another big city in eastern Ukraine, 
Kryviy Rih, People Power (based on the local 
Union of Responsible Citizens) won 6% (15,000) 
of the votes, four seats on the city council and 
22 on district councils. 
Meanwhile in Mykolayiv, an oblast city of half 
a million people in the south of the country, the 
mayoralty was won by Samopomich’s candidate, 
Oleksandr Sienkevych, a local IT entrepreneur, 
who defeated the Opposition Bloc’s candi-
date; Samopomich also won 10 out of 54 seats 
8 More in Anastasiya Rignis, Вірусна політика. Як 
створюється партія «Сила людей» [Viral politics. How 
the ‘People Power’ party was created], Українська 
Правда, 10 December 2015, http://www.pravda.com.
ua/articles/2015/12/10/7092040/
The volunteers’ activities, both the armed 
and the civilians, have shown that the peo-
ple can force the state to do something 
without overthrowing it.
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on the city council. The party owes its success 
to the rapid growth of local entrepreneurship, 
above all small traders, but also of IT compa-
nies, as well as to civic volunteers (who active-
ly supported the party). Sienkevych ran in the 
elections under the banner of transforming Mi-
kolayiv, which is more a shipyard than a trading 
port, into ‘a new Hamburg – a logistical centre.’ 
Whereas these events are evidence of ongo-
ing changes in social awareness, the case of 
Hlukhiv demonstrates the possibilities inherent 
in Ukrainian paternalism. In Hlukhiv, a neglect-
ed town in the Sumy region, the new mayor is 
Michel Tereshchenko, born in France, a descen-
dant of a Hlukhiv-related family of Ukrainian 
entrepreneurs, lawyers and social activists. 
Tereshchenko has been running a company in 
Hlukhiv for some time, and after the Revolu-
tion of Dignity he concluded that he had to take 
power from the clan of Andriy Derkach (a local 
oligarch and politician with pro-Russian views). 
And Tereshchenko won, relying largely on 
‘a whispering campaign’9. 
A slightly different situation occurred during 
the election of the mayor of Kryviy Rih. Here 
the Samopomich candidate Yuri Myloboh lost 
– by only 752 (0.5%) votes – to Yuri Vilkul (the 
father of a Party of Regions activist and a for-
mer deputy prime minister, who at the same 
time lost the election to become mayor of Dni-
propetrovsk). A measure of the changes that 
have occurred in Kryviy Rih is that his ‘Regional’ 
9 For more see Matviy Nikitin, Сімейна реліквія. 
Терещенко в сутичці за Глухів [The family heirloom. 
Tereshchenko in the battle for Hlukhiv], Українська 
Правда, 11 January 2016, http://www.pravda.com.ua/
articles/2016/01/11/7094983/
enemy could have run him so close, and even 
win in most constituencies (Vilkul had a clear 
win in only one district, which is de facto a sep-
arate city, and where voter turnout was suspi-
ciously high). Myloboh’s supporters undertook 
a protest action, and after the courts rejected 
their complaints, convinced Samopomich to 
blackmail the Ukrainian parliament and force 
it to call new mayoral elections without inval-
idating the old ones, in a manner which at the 
very least is constitutionally doubtful. The new 
elections will be held on 27 March. 
The independence generation
A measure of the generational change, the 
most important social transformation to affect 
Ukraine since 1991, is the growing number of 
those which could be called ‘the independence 
generation’, i.e. those who started their school 
education in sovereign Ukraine (born in and af-
ter 1984). According to calculations by the Rat-
ing sociological research centre, in 2015 among 
adult residents of Ukraine, the group within 
the age range of 18-35 years old (i.e. born be-
tween 1980-1995) made up 34% of the popu-
lation10, or around 13 million people; removing 
those born between 1980-1983 (who were also 
mainly educated after 1991) we get a figure of 
11 million, or one-third of the country’s adult 
population11. Their numbers and their partici-
pation in society will rise from year to year as 
successive generations of the young enter adult 
life. This group, which is still too young to aim 
for power in the country, is free of the Soviet 
heritage, and did not undergo the methods of 
indoctrination associated with that period, in-
cluding military service. Independent Ukraine is 
10 http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dinamika_ob-
schestvenno-politicheskih_nastroeniy_v_ukraine.html, 
accessed 12 January 2016.
11 In data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 
at the beginning of 2014 Ukraine had 45.2 million inhab-
itants, including 8 million aged under 18 and 6.9 million 
older than 65. The number of inhabitants on 1 December 
2015 was 42.8 million; the difference is due to the deduc-
tion of the population of Crimea, among other factors.
The number of citizens who started their 
education in a sovereign and independent 
Ukraine is growing; they now make about 
around a third of the adult population.
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the obvious reference point for them. This is also 
a group much more open to the world: they use 
modern information technologies, they know 
English, and often have experience of work in 
the EU countries (although representatives of 
the median generation are also very numerous 
among the latter). Its urban part is focused on 
a ‘European’ style and way of life, and for the 
most part shares a liberal worldview, albeit with 
a very strong admixture of patriotic values. How-
ever, the far-right element is also increasingly 
following the patterns coming from the West. 
Social mobility has been fostered by the eco-
nomic crisis (especially deindustrialisation), 
combined with opening up to the trend to-
wards globalisation. Marketing and advertis-
ing companies (in particular the IT industry12) 
developing in the cities encourage openness, 
flexibility, and the abandonment of Soviet 
cultural and social patterns. Out of necessity, 
programmers and marketers find themselves in 
the centre of the modern world wherever they 
live. It is no coincidence that a great many of 
the participants in the Maidan’s ‘permanent 
staff’ in 2014 worked in this sector. According 
to available data, this process has only covered 
the east of Ukraine to a small degree (perhaps 
12 According to some data, the IT sector employs about 
200,000-210,000 employees in Ukraine, and generates 
the fourth-largest amount of export revenue. See Yevhen 
Sysoyev: Масштаб подій в нашій IT-галузі унікальний 
навіть для Європи [The landscape of activity in our IT 
branch is unique even for Europe], Українська Правда, 
20 January 2016, http://www.epravda.com.ua/publi-
cations/2016/01/20/577478/; and Україна в стилі IT: 
9 вражаючих фактів [Ukraine in IT-style: 9 impressive 
facts], Українська Правда, 21 December 2015, http://
www.epravda.com.ua/interactive/56756ff4a17a5/
apart from Dnipropetrovsk), where the mental 
model of manual labour and bureaucratic work 
still predominates. 
However, the change in the attitudes and views 
of the Ukrainian people will not be limited to 
the coming generation. Up until the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, nearly all its citizens were 
completely dependent on the state; they ac-
cepted this situation in principle, and expected 
that the state would guarantee them prosperity 
and security (both social and public). After its 
demise, the people had to deal with a reality 
in which the state had ceased to meet their 
obligations, and the new ideological narration 
rewarded examples of individual success. In 
Ukraine, the extent to which people had to ‘get 
by’ in the face of the collapse of the ‘old’ and 
the faults of the ‘new’ was enormous: small 
trading, working abroad, creating communities 
of inhabitants, local self-defence units (espe-
cially by holders of agricultural allotments), etc. 
These initiatives not only met the basic needs 
of living, but also changed individual and social 
awareness. Their success proved that the indi-
vidual does not need to be the property of the 
state; that one could be an citizen independent 
of that state, both materially and morally; and 
that one could organise one’s life for oneself, 
not only on the domestic level, but also socially. 
Not everyone accepted this transformation (es-
pecially the oldest generation, which felt that 
the end of the Soviet system was an injustice), 
but it applied to everyone – even the workers in 
heavy industry, albeit to the least extent. 
So the new Ukrainian society is being born; but 
the process is still not finished. An important 
component of the new social awareness is in-
dividualism, which contrasts with the collec-
tivism of the Soviet period (ideological) and 
that of heavy industry (which was required by 
the nature of the work of the great industrial 
enterprises). Also, in a startling way, this new 
civic awareness is well in keeping with the tra-
ditional Ukrainian ‘anarcho-democracy’, whose 
roots can be traced back to the Cossack peri-
The revolution has brought new people to 
power, but no new political environment. 
Before 2014, Ukraine’s current leaders 
were members of the political and eco-
nomic establishment.
7OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 199
od, and examples of which are perpetuated in 
classic and contemporary historical literature13. 
Both of these have been evident in the course of 
the Revolution of Dignity, as well as during the 
war: on the one hand, spontaneous, polycentric 
self-organisation, and on the other, a reluctance 
to submit to discipline or create a hierarchical-
ly-led organisation based on long-term activity.
The spectre of anarchy
The positive programme of the Revolution of 
Dignity – a radical modernisation of the state 
by cleansing it of corruption (and of the cor-
rupt), as well as the modernisation of the le-
gal system – has not brought about the de-
sired result; its implementation is impossible at 
present, without a new, strong social impetus. 
The revolution has brought new people to 
power, but no new political environment. Be-
fore 2014, the vast majority of Ukraine’s current 
leaders were second- or third-level members of 
the political and economic establishment. The 
collapse of the most desired reform, namely 
the fight against corruption, is causing growing 
frustration, as is the year-long state of ‘neither 
war nor peace’ in the east, and the sense that 
the constant stream of new victims have suf-
fered for nothing. 
13 Here we may mention the first and most important 
Ukrainian historical novel, The Black Council [Чорна 
рада] by Panteleimon Kulish, as well as Gogol’s Taras 
Bulba [Тарас Бульба], which is considered to belong to 
‘native’ – although, as it was written in Russian, not nec-
essarily ‘Ukrainian’ – literature; as well as the contempo-
rary novel Black Crow [Залишенець. Чорний ворон] by 
Vasyl Shkliar, which deals with the fight of the anti-Sovi-
et insurgents from 1919-1922.
For now, the Ukrainian people have not shown 
any readiness to hold new protests, and the 
sense of the revolution’s failure has not led 
them to risk creating new victims. However 
society is much better organised now, thanks 
to the existence of the volunteer networks, 
even though they are currently inactive. The 
public has also become much better armed; in 
a country where there were always many hunt-
ing weapons and small arms in private hands, 
a large amount of military weapons have come 
into civilian hands over the past two years14. The 
country has also gained a considerable number 
of young people who have not only received 
military training, but who have also had combat 
experience, and learned the courage that flows 
from it. In this situation, there is a high risk that 
new public protests (if they occur) would be ac-
companied from the beginning by large-scale 
violence, the more so as both the overthrow 
of the Yanukovych regime and the rejection of 
the compromise negotiated by the politicians 
made the public aware that the use of force can 
bring results. Some even fear the outbreak of 
a civil war and an anarchic atamanshchyna15 
(uncoordinated military-political activity) which 
could threaten the survival of the state. The lat-
ter fears seem exaggerated, but they are a fac-
tor in policy decisions, including those taken by 
the government. 
The risk of such protests breaking out is associ-
ated above all with the possibility of the armed 
conflict in the Donets Basin ending in a way un-
favourable for Kyiv. Recognition by the central 
14 According to estimates based on the data from law en-
forcement authorities and non-governmental organisa-
tions, the number of illegal weapons in private hands in 
Ukraine stands at between 4.5 and 6 million units, and the 
number of crimes involving firearms has risen almost two 
and a half times in 2015 compared to the previous year. 
See Oksana Loy, До зброї готові! Українці стали стріляти 
один в одного втричі частіше [Take aim! Ukrainians three 
times more likely to shoot each other], Главком, 10 Decem-
ber 2015; http://glavcom.ua/articles/35932.html
15 In Ukrainian historiography, the ‘Atamanshchyna’ (Ukr. 
отаманщина, Ru. атаманщина) refers to the anti-Sovi-
et insurgent movements in the years 1919-1922, which 
were unable to create a central headquarters or a politi-
cal leadership.
The revolution has brought new people to 
power, but no new political environment. 
Before 2014, Ukraine’s current leaders 
were members of the political and eco-
nomic establishment.
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Ukrainian government of the separatist repub-
lics’ formal autonomy would produce not only 
deep public opposition, but also the threat of 
rebellion by armed volunteer formations who 
would feel they had been betrayed, not defeat-
ed (the ‘stab in the back’ syndrome). It seems 
that Kyiv is aware of this risk16: hence the 2015 
merger of most of the volunteer formations 
with the state’s armed forces; hence also the 
ongoing state of ‘neither war nor peace’, and 
the avoidance of any actions that could be con-
sidered as ‘capitulation’. 
Some of the spontaneously-organised armed 
formations, militias of radical political parties 
and veterans groups are associated with indi-
vidual oligarchs and politicians. In the case of 
a final split within the ruling elite in Kyiv, some 
of these groups may be tempted to use them 
(such precedents, in the form of paramilitary 
activities in obscure political interests, have al-
ready been set). Such a turn of events would 
genuinely threaten the possibility of civil war. 
On the other hand, among social elites not 
linked to the establishment, demands for rad-
icalism are rising. One sign of this is a recent 
article by the social philosopher and so-called 
opinion-former Serhiy Datsiuk, entitled ‘The 
danger of avoiding revolution and war’17, in 
which he writes directly that civil war may be 
one of the only possible (and permissible!) ways 
to get out of the current crisis: “a new Maidan 
in the form of a civil war, during which some of 
the ruling layer will be physically destroyed, and 
the rest forced to immerse themselves in the 
common existence of the public, including the 
16 The fact that this is a realistic possibility was proved during 
a demonstration against the amendment of the constitu-
tion on 31 August 2015, during which a Freedom Party 
thug threw a grenade at a police cordon, killing three peo-
ple and injuring at least a dozen. Further evidence is the 
spontaneous action by members of paramilitary organisa-
tions in February 2016 to stop Russian goods trucks travel-
ling through Ukraine, in advance of an official ban.
17 Serhiy Datsiuk, Небезпека уникнення революції та 
війни, Glavpost, 4 December 2015, http://glavpost.com/
post/4dec2015/blogs/68605-sergiy-dacyuk-nebezpe-
ka-uniknennya-revolyuciyi-ta-viyni.html
experience of losing relatives and loved ones, of 
poverty, of insecurity about the future.” In a so-
ciety which has been pauperised, disappointed 
in its hopes, mourning its dead, such sugges-
tions may have a broad appeal. 
Summary
A complete description of the social transfor-
mations taking place in Ukraine is impossible; 
there are too many initiatives, trends and or-
ganisations, and their dynamics are too fast and 
still too incomplete to fully grasp. The unstable 
situation in the country, as well as the general 
acceleration of change worldwide, makes it dif-
ficult to predict which will prove long-lasting 
and which purely ephemeral (which does not 
mean that the latter are unimportant). The only 
undoubtedly permanent and irreversible trans-
formation is that of the generational factor; 
however, the trends towards modernisation 
and pro-Western attitudes among the young 
generation could be threatened by increasing 
emigration after the European Union abolishes 
its visa requirement. 
The extent to which the transformation of so-
ciety initiated during the Revolution of Digni-
ty, bringing Ukraine up to European notions 
of civil society, will be consolidated depends 
to a large extent on the implementation of at 
least some of the reforms (which will depend 
on those governing the state, as well as on 
how the conflict in the east of the country is 
resolved). Implementing the planned local gov-
ernment reform and reducing corruption will 
be conducive to the growth of social activity, 
the sense of responsibility for one’s own town 
or neighbourhood, and may also contribute to 
the containment of migration trends (not only 
foreign emigration, but also escape from the 
villages and smaller towns to the big cities). The 
failure or neglect of these actions will cause dis-
appointment, which may lead not to new pro-
tests (although this is not impossible), but to 
the recurrence of apathy. 
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The development of new policy initiatives 
would be hindered by early general elections, 
which would most likely only lead to a reshuffle 
within the current party system. The new polit-
ical forces are still too weak, organisationally, 
programmatically and financially, to effectively 
fight for a position in parliament which would 
give them real influence over its work. From 
their point of view, it would be better if the 
elections were held at the constitutionally ap-
pointed time, in the autumn of 2019. 
The way in which the Donbas conflict is re-
solved will be much more important, especially 
as a huge part of the new social initiatives are 
involved with it in one way or another. If the 
current state of ‘neither war nor peace’ goes 
on, this will favour the continuation of volun-
teer activities (aid to the military and the veter-
ans is still needed) and the consolidation of the 
civic movements which see the need to either 
support or replace the state. The resumption of 
large-scale armed hostilities (however unlikely 
at the moment) would give impetus to these 
initiatives, and would also focus people around 
the state. However, any political solution lead-
ing to the de facto recognition of the break-
away areas’ independence within the Ukrainian 
state would, on the one hand, produce violent 
protests which could threaten the state; and on 
the other, a widespread collapse of social activ-
ity, a recurrence of apathy and an increase in 
emigration.
